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1After the 1997/1998 Asian financial crisis, many economies in the region set out to 
rebuild their savings, sometimes to excess. Capital inflows further boosted liquid-
ity after interest rates in the US and Europe fell in early 2000. The resulting com-
bination of large savings and lower borrowing costs spurred credit creation and 
economic growth, especially in emerging Asia. At the same time, appreciation 
pressures on exchange rates increased as did the overall risk to financial  stability. 
Procyclicality risks are particularly high when capital flows reverse direction: 
Rapid liquidity growth can turn into a sharp contraction. So with plenty of liquid-
ity and low borrowing costs, individuals, banks, and companies all shifted their 
preference toward more risky investments.
What started this trend? The 2000s began with easy money policies in 
advanced economies. Responding to the 2000 recession and the 11 September 
2001 political shock, the US federal funds rate fell precipitously—from over 6 % 
in 2001 to just 1 % by the summer of 2003. Over the same period, the European 
Central Bank (ECB) rate dropped from over 4 to 2 %. Fears of asset bubbles sub-
sequently brought interest rates back up in the US and Europe. By late 2007, on 
the eve of recession and the subprime crisis, rates had risen fivefold in the US and 
doubled in Europe. As the US recession began in December 2007, the US Federal 
Reserve (US Fed) shifted gears again, lowering rates steadily—from more than 5 
to 2 % by mid-2008. The subsequent collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 
that year forced the US Fed to be more aggressive. Rates fell to 0.25 % and 
remained there, at least through the third quarter of 2014 (when this was written). 
Interest rates in the Eurozone fell just as dramatically—a steady decline from over 
4 % in 2007 to 1 % shortly after the Lehman crisis, to 0.5 % in mid-2013, and 
0.15 % currently.
Global liquidity responded accordingly. Massive amounts of capital surged out 
of advanced economies into emerging markets. Emerging Asia was among the big-
gest beneficiaries—estimated inflows between November 2008 and April 2013 
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totaled $2.1 trillion. Early on, much of these inflows were intermediated through 
banks (throughout this book called “bank-led flows”). This was the first phase of 
global liquidity. Then, in 2008, the worst crisis since the 1930s Great Depression 
erupted. Capital flows plunged worldwide, but rapidly recovered. By autumn 
2010, liquidity flows were surging again, although this time predominantly 
through capital markets, including local currency bond markets (called “debt-led 
flows” here). This was the second phase of global liquidity. Compared with what 
led to the 1997/1998 Asian financial crisis, the size of flows going to emerging 
Asia was larger and more volatile. If reversed, the impact would be quickly felt. 
For example, when the US Fed announced in May 2013 its intention to taper quan-
titative easing (QE), investors quickly pulled out of emerging markets. Some mar-
kets were clearly rattled, hitting affected economies with a double-punch—volatile 
capital markets and depreciated exchange rates. With the knowledge US monetary 
policy would soon begin to “normalize,” risk perceptions toward emerging mar-
kets rose. Those with perceived vulnerabilities saw the greatest volatility. This is 
what we call the third phase of global liquidity.
This book describes these three phases of global liquidity and their impact on 
emerging Asia from conceptual and empirical perspectives. What stands out is 
the important role noncore bank liabilities played in the process. Together with the 
growing significance of capital markets in the second phase, it has changed the 
financial and monetary policy landscape sufficiently to warrant a new regulatory 
framework, alternative early warning indicators, and as a result a set of macropru-
dential policies to complement monetary policy.
After discussing conceptual and measurement issues related to this changing 
global liquidity, Chap. 2 presents the background and details of how global liquid-
ity evolved from phase one to phase two and then phase three.
Permissive conditions in the US dollar wholesale market were behind the 
development of phase one—with liquidity transmitted via the global banking sys-
tem to the rest of the world, including emerging Asia. This showed up in expand-
ing bank balance sheets through increased noncore liabilities that facilitated 
more and larger lending, along with greater risk-taking behavior. Even nonfinan-
cial institutions took on attributes of financial firms (“financialization”), as they 
increased the size of their balance sheets relative to generating sales. As a conse-
quence, this contributed to the amplification of financial cycles. Currency appreci-
ation further fueled inflows as borrowers’ balance sheets were strengthened. To the 
extent rising noncore liabilities are highly procyclical and are an important trans-
mission channel of global liquidity shocks to emerging Asia, the resulting financial 
cycles were out of sync with domestic business cycles. As a result, on top of the 
elevated risks caused by the bank-led credit boom, it also reduced the effectiveness 
of monetary policy—and this led to the call for separate macroprudential policy.
In phase two, the massive amount of inflows into emerging markets saw credit 
grow through corporate bond issuance by nonfinancial borrowers. In emerging 
Asia, governments used the opportunity of low-cost financing to increase their 
bond issuance, allowing them to make “maturity adjustments” (sovereign bonds 
replacing short‐term debt). The region’s capital markets boomed during this 
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phase. Local currency bonds outstanding reached $7.2 trillion by March 2014, a 
dramatic increase considering that some economies in the region had virtually no 
bond  market prior to 1997. Also, the share of foreign ownership in local currency 
bond markets rose, as did bank holdings of sovereign bonds. With interest rates 
low, the issuance of international government and corporate securities in emerg-
ing markets also increased rapidly. If the vulnerability in the first phase caused by 
bank-led flows through noncore liabilities is linked with procyclicality effects, the 
second phase vulnerability caused by debt-led flows is associated with sporadic 
and  sudden outflows.
The first and second phases of global liquidity set the stage for the third phase. 
Here, the story is about capital flow reversals. The bond market sell-off following 
the hint that QE would soon begin tapering in mid-2013 spread quickly to emerg-
ing markets, with an immediate impact of rising bond yields, higher interbank 
rates, and depreciating currencies, albeit not evenly across all markets. With banks 
holding large amounts of securities and equities, the link between banks and capi-
tal markets is strong. Any shock that causes asset prices to fall can worsen bank 
balance sheets. This complicates policy choices, especially in economies where 
the local investor base is small and macrofundamentals weak.
But even economies with relatively good fundamentals saw capital exit, 
as US market risk was perceived to be lower. All of these economies saw their 
exchange rates depreciate against the US dollar, with the exception of the ren-
minbi and Philippine peso. Bond markets in economies with strong fundamentals 
(such as Malaysia; the Philippines; Hong Kong, China; and Singapore) also saw 
bond yields rise. Typically prone to “buying the rumor and selling the news,” their 
respective equity markets also suffered.
Given the different circumstances of each phase, Chap. 3 argues that  relevant 
early warning indicators should also evolve and be adjusted based on the main 
drivers of inflows and associated risks. In phase one, banks are center stage in 
credit growth, a focus on noncore liabilities of financial intermediaries will most 
likely yield timely signals. On the other hand, when spending and credit are 
funded by bond issuance in phase two, an appropriate early warning indicator 
would emphasize aggregate issuance. Tracking aggregate corporate cash holdings 
is also important to mitigate risks caused by “carry trade” activities. The bulk of 
the discussion in Chap. 3 is devoted to this. For phase three, the challenge is more 
complex. But as the stage was set by the first and second phases, the indicators 
proposed in phase one and phase two remain relevant for phase three.
Chapter 4 scrutinizes the extent to which emerging Asia’s noncore liabilities 
have reached a level that makes them vulnerable. Although Asia’s share of noncore 
liabilities in total liabilities remains relatively small, they have grown rapidly 
as a ratio to GDP. Consistent with findings based on the Flow of Fund analysis 
cited in Chap. 2, we show the increase significantly contributed to the expansion 
of bank assets. The important contribution of noncore liabilities to credit growth 
is also confirmed by the regression test we conducted, supporting our conjec-
ture that a relevant early warning indicator should focus on noncore liabili-
ties. More importantly, it limits the effectiveness of monetary policy. And if this 
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limitation is overlooked—existing monetary policy intensified by adding more—
the  probability of bank bankruptcies would increase as a bank’s net worth tends 
to decline. Hence, an effective macroprudential policy that supplements standard 
monetary policy is needed to make monetary policy more effective, with financial 
stability added as an additional objective.
The extent that changes in global liquidity combine with a liberalized financial 
sector enhances the amount of liquidity flowing in. But it also increases the risk 
of instability. Thus, it would have helped had there been more global and regional 
cooperation in policymaking. In reality, however, even as economies become more 
interdependent, national policy continues to rule irrespective of spillovers on other 
economies and all the talk of cooperation and policy coordination. The ultra‐easy 
monetary policies adopted in advanced economies (“financial nationalism”) are a 
case in point. In turn, this forces policy makers in emerging markets to take unilat-
eral policies to mitigate the resulting impact.
While the focus of the discussion so far has been on the implications of capital 
flows on financial and macroeconomic stability, their impact on development must 
be assessed. This is done in Chap. 5. By using a general equilibrium framework 
with a rather detailed financial module, we show that capital inflows are closely 
linked to income inequality. We argue that capital inflows not only increase the 
risk of financial instability, but also the inequality in household income distribu-
tion—particularly if banks with the new liquidity take on more risky investments. 
On the other hand, results of model simulations show that when banks act pru-
dently by allocating loans to more productive investments in the real economy—
rather than parking funds in risky financial instruments—capital inflows would 
improve income inequality. This is because output grows, and hence, the increase 
in factor income is higher than the increase in financial income accrued by retail 
investors from rich urban households. Therefore, the challenge is how to create a 
system where banks are discouraged from taking on risky investments. From this 
perspective, macroprudential policy would also work toward reducing income ine-
quality in the case of rising capital inflows.
Typically, income inequality is never explicitly on the list of criteria for 
 designing macro and financial policy. Yet inequality is rising in nearly all 
 economies—advanced and emerging alike—and increasingly tops the  development 
challenges faced by policymakers. How would adding another objective alter the 
priority of policy alternatives? Would adding the social goal of reducing income 
inequality change policy choices? And, in particular, would macroprudential policy 
remain relevant? We cite the benefits and advantage of imposing a levy on noncore 
liabilities as one potential macroprudential policy. How well would this work com-
pared with other policies? Based on a perception model, the analysis in the final 
section of Chap. 5 shows the answer depends on whether or not we consider both 
upsides and downsides of each policy alternative. Encouraging capital outflows 
during tranquil periods—rather than assigning a levy to noncore liabilities—works 
better when only policy benefits are considered. But when the costs and risks are 
taken into account simultaneously with the benefits, assigning a levy on noncore 
liabilities makes better sense.
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Thus, while this book argues throughout that in the midst of changing global 
liquidity macroprudential policy is needed to complement monetary policy, the 
analysis in Chap. 5 shows that certain type of macroprudential policy can also be 
favorable for reducing income inequality.
As there are many ways to group macroprudential tools, Chap. 6 classifies 
those tools by distinguishing between (i) asset-side tools that directly limit bank 
loan growth; (ii) liability-side tools that limit vulnerability to liquidity and cur-
rency mismatches; and (iii) bank capital-oriented tools that limit loan growth 
through altering bank incentives. Assigning a levy on noncore liabilities is 
among the liability-side tools we propose to address the buildup of vulnerabili-
ties to liquidity and currency mismatches and the underpricing of global capital 
market risk. It mitigates pricing distortions that lead to excessive asset growth. 
The Financial Stability Contribution (FSC) recommended by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) on the bank levy to the G20 leaders in June 2010 is an 
example of such a corrective tax. We believe the levy could mitigate the buildup 
of systemic risk through currency or maturity mismatches by counteracting distor-
tions to global funding conditions and the “supply push” from global banks.
So the main message is this: The dynamics of global liquidity since early 2000 
has had ramifications worldwide, the most important a surge in capital flows. For 
emerging markets on the receiving end—which includes those in Asia—liquidity 
surged, first through banks’ increased noncore liabilities and then via expanding 
capital markets. Both boosted investment and growth. But at the same time, they 
also elevated the risk of instability, worsened income inequality, and reduced the 
effectiveness of monetary policy. Without understanding the process and transmis-
sion mechanism that lower the effectiveness of standard policies, policy makers 
may be tempted to try bigger doses of the same monetary policy when intended 
results are not met. This will actually increase the risk of bankruptcies. Instead, the 
distinct characteristics of capital flows during the three phases of global liquidity 
point to the need for early warning indicators to evolve and be adjusted for each 
phase. Based on the analyses and the more relevant early warning indicators, we 
argue a set of macroprudential policies is needed to complement monetary policy.
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